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PENNS YL VANIA v. PORTER *:
THE STATE AS PLAINTIFF UNDER
42 U.S.C. § 1983
Section 1983 provides that every "person" who deprives any
citizen or other "person" of constitutional rights shall be liable
to that "person."' Courts have frequently faced the question of
whether states and other governmental bodies are "persons"
and, therefore, appropriate defendants under § 1983.2 In Penn659 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1981).
1. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
2. States are not usually appropriate defendants under § 1983 because
immunities are granted to the states by the eleventh amendment. Alabama
v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (per curiam) (federal injunction violated ban on
federal suit by private parties against the state without its permission);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (award of wrongfully withheld welfare payments violated prohibition on awards of funds from state treasury);
Thompson v. New York, 487 F. Supp. 212 (N.D.N.Y. 1979) (state is not a "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Congress, however, has sometimes expressly
allowed suits against, or recovery of damages from, the state. See, e.g.,
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act of 1976, which authorized the award of attorneys' fees in suits against
state officials in their official capacities does not violate the eleventh amendment); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 gives employees of the state the right to bring suit against the
state); Peel v. Florida Dept. of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979) (Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act authorizes suit against a state).
Courts routinely extended immunity to local governments. See, e.g.,
City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973) (city not a "person" for purposes of equitable relief under § 1983); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)
(city not a "person" for purposes of § 1983). The Supreme Court, however,
withdrew absolute immunity for municipalities in 1978 and allowed suit
against New York City for the misconduct of its employees. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (city liable for damages arising from department policy which forced pregnant employees to go on
unpaid leave before it was medically necessary). The Court affirmed its decision in 1980 and at the same time settled the controversy among the lower
courts over whether good faith is a valid defense in § 1983 actions. Owen v.
City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (police chief sued city for wrongful discharge; good faith does not entitle the city to qualified immunity
under § 1983). Accord Bertot v. School District No. 1, 613 F.2d 245 (10th Cir.
1979) (wrongful discharge; right to recovery does not depend on bad faith).
Contra, Paxman v. Campbell, 612 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980) (per curiam)
(forced maternity leave; officials enjoy immunity as long as they act in good
faith; decided before Owen).
*
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sylvania v. Porter,3 a federal court for the first time faced the
question of whether the state, even though not a "person," is an
appropriate plaintiff. In a plurality opinion, 4 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted standing as a plaintiff to the
state under the doctrine of parens patriae.5
The Borough of Millvale is a small town on the fringes of
Pittsburgh. In 1973, the Borough Council of Millvale hired Frank
L. Baranyai as a police officer. About one year later, citizens began complaining to the council about Baranyai's methods of law
enforcement.6 The complaints continued for the next three
years and progressed from allegations of verbal harassment to
corroborated charges of illegal searches and seizures and of
beatings of handcuffed prisoners. 7 Neither the mayor, the police
chief, nor the council took any action to curb Baranyai's alleged
excesses, or even to investigate the complaints.8 On the contrary, the mayor, the police chief, and some of the council members openly supported Baranyai's tactics and joined him in
3. 480 F. Supp. 686 (W.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd, 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1980) (3
judge panel reversed holding that Pennsylvania lacked standing), en banc
vacating and withdrawing the 3 judge panel's opinion, 659 F.2d 306 (3d Cir.
1981) (affirming the state's standing and reversing as to the injunction's applicability to the borough council).
4. Three judges voted to affirm the injunction granted by the district
court in its entirety, three to reverse in its entirety, and two to affirm in part
and reverse in part. For the purposes of this discussion, the affirming opinion will be referred to as the majority and the dissenting/reversing opinion
as the minority.
5. The doctrine of parens patriae gives the state standing to litigate
injuries to its citizens if its own interests were also injured in a separate
and distinct way by the acts of the defendants. See infra notes 24-30 and
accompanying text.
6. Most of the complaints involved a 1911 disorderly conduct ordinance
which defined disorderly persons as "[a]U persons persisting in loitering
upon the public highway or streetcorners and in front of any store, shops,
places of business, place of amusement or place of worship after being requested to vacate such place or places and move on" and "[a]ll suspicious
persons or person who can give no reasonable account of themselves."
Millvale, Pa., Ordinance 305 (1911). Officer Baranyai interpreted the ordinance broadly; in separate incidents, he arrested two women, one of whom
was a clerk of the county court, a group of men, and an eleven-year-old boy
while they were lawfully on the streets. Baranyai held the child at the police station without reading Miranda warnings or calling the boy's parents.
He later testified that he did not regard this as an arrest. 480 F. Supp. 686,
688-90 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
7. The first finding of fact by the district court of violations of rights
was the arrest of Margaret Blume. Baranyai claimed that the middle-aged
woman dressed up like her teenaged daughter in order to entrap him into
making a false arrest, but he completed the arrest even after he recognized
Mrs. Blume. Subsequent findings noted six instances of physical assault
with a blackjack or nightstick upon handcuffed prisoners, two instances of
physical assault on the street, two illegal searches, and four attempts to intimidate complainants. 480 F. Supp. 686, 688-91 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
8. Id. at 690-91.
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harassing, intimidating, and villifying those who complained. 9
The situation came to the attention of the Community Advocate
Unit of the Office of the Pennsylvania Attorney General, which
ified criminal charges against Baranyai in the summer of 1977.
After his indictment and even after his conviction, 10 Baranyai
remained on active duty. During this time, the council passed
two resolutions supporting his conduct."
In October, 1977, the Community Advocate Unit filed suit
under § 1983 in federal court seeking to enjoin Baranyai, the
mayor, the police chief, and the Borough Council from committing or encouraging further violations of fourteenth amendment
rights.' 2 The state claimed standing as a plaintiff under the doctrine ofparenspatriae.The defendants challenged the standing
of the state as a plaintiff and also moved to dismiss the action for
failure to state a claim for which injunctive relief could be
granted. 13 The court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of
standing, provided that within twenty days the state added individual plaintiffs.' 4 Based on forty-four findings of fact, the dis9. Id. at 689-91.

10. Baranyai was convicted of one count each of simple assault and official oppression on complaint of David Stier, and one count of official oppression on complaint of the Deputy Attorney General. Twenty-two other
charges were dismissed. 480 F. Supp. 686, 690 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
11. The council passed the first resolution in support of Baranyai on
July 12, 1977, after it learned of the state's indictments; the second resolution came on February 14, 1978, after Baranyai's conviction. The conviction
is currently on appeal. 480 F. Supp. 686, 691 (W.D. Pa. 1979). While the suit
was pending in district court, the mayor tried to promote Baranyai to sergeant, but the council refused to confirm the appointment. Brief for Appellee at 22, Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1981).
12. The Commonwealth filed suit in federal court because it had no adequate remedy under its own laws. Millvale is incorporated under the Pennsylvania Borough Code, which provides for removal of police officers by the
borough council upon complaint of the mayor. The collaboration of the
mayor and the police chief with Baranyai made voluntary removal of
Baranyai unlikely. 480 F. Supp. 686, 695 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
13. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, alleging that the court had no power to interfere with the operations of
Millvale's police force under the decision in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976) (citizens sued city of Philadelphia for brutality by two police officers
who were not party to the suit). The district court refused to follow Rizzo,
noting that the present case is not analogous. In Rizzo, two nonparty officers in a force of 7500 which served a city of 1,750,000 were accused of
twenty instances of misconduct. There was neither evidence of official encouragement nor official knowledge. In this case, a named defendant single-handedly inflicted more than twenty injuries in a town of 5000, and the
town fathers had knowledge of his activities and actively encouraged him.
Further, the Rizzo decision was based partially on the prohibition of federal
meddling in state affairs. Federalism is not an issue here, however, since
the state itself requested federal aid. 480 F. Supp. 686, 694 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
14. The district court required the addition of private plaintiffs, but denied class certification, ruling that "the Commonwealth was representing
the rights of all of its citizens," and that "the action is properly brought by
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trict court also ruled that the complaint did state a5 cause of
action and that a permanent injunction should issue.'
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit denied the state's claims of standing as a plaintiff and reversed the district court. 16 On petition by the plaintiffs, the court ordered a rehearing en banc and vacated the
panel opinion. 17 In a plurality opinion, the full court affirmed
the Commonwealth joining to protect the constitutional rights of its citizens
and to support those individuals who have specifically joined alleging individual grievances." 480 F. Supp. 686, 695 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
15. The order of the district court enjoined Baranyai from detaining citizens without probable cause, using wrongful or excessive force or physical
abuse, or illegally searching citizens or their homes or automobiles.
Baranyai, the mayor, and the police chief were enjoined from harassing,
threatening, intimidating, or retaliating against plaintiffs or other complainants. All defendants were enjoined from encouraging or abetting violations
of the injunction, and were prohibited from employing Baranyai except as
an unarmed desk officer. The court also retained jurisdiction over the case
for purposes of enforcing the order.
Problems arose from the court's syntax in the section which limited the
scope of Baranyai's employment:
All of the defendants are hereby enjoined effective 5 days from the
date of this order from employing defendant Baranyai and Baranyai is
enjoined from serving as a police officer or law enforcement official on
any basis in the Borough of Millvale except as a desk policeman whose
activities shall be entirely confined to the police station of the Borough
of Millvale and he is further enjoined from possessing or using upon
prisoners or other persons any weapons of any kind....

so that his

activities with the Millvale Police Force shall be entirely confined to
desk duty and in the course of such duty he shall not be permitted to
use any weapons of any kind upon prisoners or other persons.
(3d Cir. 1981) 659 F.2d 306, 313 n.7.
The structure of the sentence allowed the minority to argue that the
injunction was internally inconsistent, first prohibiting employment completely and then limiting employment to desk duty. 659 F.2d 306, 338 (3d Cir.
1981) (Garth, J., dissenting).
Four days after the injunction was issued, the court modified the order
to stay the portion that limited Baranyai to desk duty and barred him from
possessing weapons. The stay was conditioned on the filing by Baranyai of
a $10,000 surety bond and on Baranyai's compliance with the other provisions of the order. The same day, the defendants filed an emergency petition with the circuit court. Judge Aldisert affirmed the trial court's order,
modifying it only to the extent that the bond could be supplied by Baranyai
or the borough. Subsequently, the Borough Council posted the bond. Brief
for Appellee at 5-6, Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1981).
16. The panel denied standing to the state on any basis and in particular
held that the state is not a "person" under § 1983. The definition of "person"
became an issue because the state was claiming standing both as parens
patriaefor the injury to its quasi-sovereign rights and as a "person" for the
injury to its sovereign rights. See infra note 25. The lower court disposed of
the question by finding no injury. The Commonwealth continued to assert
personal standing until just before the rehearing before the full court, and
then conceded that the state is not a "person," and that its sovereign rights
are not protected by § 1983. 659 F.2d 306, 327 (3d Cir. 1981).
17. While the appeal was pending, Baranyai left Millvale to take a position as a police officer in another Pennsylvania town. The other defendants
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the trial court's decision to apply parenspatriaeand upheld the
injunction as to Baranyai, the mayor, and the police chief, but
reversed as to the Borough Council. 18 The question which divided the court was, once again, the standing of the state as a
plaintiff. All of the judges accepted the trial court's findings, of
fact, and all agreed on the propriety of injunctive relief. 19 The
minority, however, urged remand for certification as a class action 20 and removal of the state as a plaintiff, 2 1 while the majority
accepted the state as a plaintiff under parens patriae22
The doctrine of parens patriae arose in medieval Britain
when the king stood at court for charitable uses and for persons
who were under legal disability, such as children and incompetents.23 That application of the doctrine was adopted by courts
in the United States and is still in use.24 American courts exmoved to dissolve the injunction for mootness. The circuit court denied the
motion, noting that Baranyai was still employed as a police officer and that
the mayor and the police chief continued in their offices. Since the court
could not say with assurance that the abuse would not recur if the injunction was dissolved, the order was left intact. 659 F.2d 306, 313 (3d Cir. 1981).
18. The standards set by Rizzo require that the defendant be causally
connected to the violation if he is to be held liable; mere failure to act is not
enough. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976). See also Allee v. Medrano,
416 U.S. 802 (1974) (Texas Rangers engaged in a pattern of intimidation of
farm labor organizers in direct violation of plaintiffs rights); Hague v. CIO,
307 U.S. 496 (1939) (city officials actively violated plaintiffs' rights by adopting policy of harassing union organizers). The minority felt that the evidence strongly supported the injunction as to the three individual
defendants, but was less clear as to the council.
Rizzo requires positive action which violates the plaintiffs' rights; the
Borough Council was guilty only of inaction. In addition, the membership
of the council had changed. 659 F.2d 306, 337-39 (3d Cir. 1981) (Garth, J.,
dissenting). In contrast, the majority noted that even if one did not find the
council culpable under Rizzo, enjoining the council was still an appropriate
means of making the injunction fully effective against the other defendants.
When a nonculpable party is capable of frustrating the purpose of an order,
it also may be properly enjoined. 659 F.2d at 325 (3d Cir. 1981).
19. 659 F.2d at 325, 339 (3d Cir. 1981).
20. The individual plaintiffs requested class certification at the trial
level; defendants opposed it. The district court denied certification because
the state was a party and was representing the persons who would have
been included in the class. On appeal, the defendants argued that the state
was not a valid plaintiff, that the individual plaintiffs were not class representatives, and that, therefore, the injunction ran only as to the named
plaintiffs. The court noted that such modification left the defendants free to
abuse all other persons in Millvale, and remarked that "it comes with little
grace for the defendants to urge as a ground for reversal the very absence of
class action certification which they insisted upon in the trial court." Id. at
313-14.
21. Id. at 339.
22. Id. at 314. See supra note 6.
23. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, 47-78 (12th ed. 1793).
24. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Smithsonian Institution, 485 F. Supp.
1222 (D.D.C. 1980) (declaratory judgment asked to construe terms and conditions of charitable gifts to the Smithsonian); Pennsylvania v. Brown, 260
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panded the doctrine allowing states to defend their "quasi-sovereign interests." Although "quasi-sovereign interest" has
never been defined, 25 courts have limited application of the doctrine almost exclusively to disputes over the environment 26 and
interstate commerce. 27 Regardless of the nature of the dispute,
three requirements must be fulfiled before quasi-sovereign interest parens patriae can be applied: 1) the dispute must affect
a substantial portion of the population, 28 2) the private remedy
F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Pa. 1966), rev'd and rem'd, 373 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1967) (en
banc), 270 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1967), affid, 392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir.) (en
bane), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968) (state sued on behalf of minor orphans to desegregate a charitable educational institution).
25. A number of courts have attempted to define "quasi-sovereign interest," but have been uniformly unsuccessful. One court called the attempts
largely unhelpful generalities. Some examples are: "health and comfort of
the inhabitants," Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901); "general welfare," Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46,99 (1907); "independent of and behind
the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain," Georgia
v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907); "an interest apart from
that of the individuals affected," Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553,
592 (1923); "state's economy and the health, safety, and welfare of its people," Pennsylvania ex rel. Shapp v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 671 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 US. 977 (1976); "controversy must ...

implicate the state's in-

terest in economic supervision." Id. at 674.
What began as interests of the state which arose from its sovereignty
over all territory within its boundaries expanded to include interests in
nontangibles such as the economy and general welfare. What is included
within those nebulous boundaries remains unclear. Courts treat the categories as elastic and stretch them to cover modern concerns. A recent decision extended general welfare to include public morale. Puerto Rico v.
Alfred L. Snapp &Sons, 632 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1980).
26. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (noxious fumes
from plant in Tennessee killed vegetation in five Georgia counties); Kansas
v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902) (diversion of natural water flows); Missouri
v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (Illinois corporation polluted the Mississippi
River).
27. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (railroad charged
higher rates in Georgia than in surrounding states); Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (West Virginia natural gas regulations discriminated against out-of-state users).
Courts have been reluctant to extend parenspatriae beyond the traditional bounds of interstate commerce and the environment or to the traditional remedy of injunction. Even when they expand the bounds, they
retain the remedy. For example, in 1945, the Supreme Court allowed parens
patriae in an antitrust action for injunction, but in 1972, disallowed parens
patriae in an antitrust suit which requested both an injunction and damages. Compare Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972) (antitrust
suit for injunction and damages; parens patriae denied), with Georgia v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (anti-trust suit for injunction only;
parenspatriae allowed). The expressed fear of the court in damage suits is
the possibility of double recovery. 405 U.S. 251, 264 (1972).
28. Under this requirement, a state may not redress purely private
grievances as a volunteer. If this were not so, the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in cases which involve states would enable disputes which
otherwise had no rightful access to the federal courts to be heard by the
Supreme Court. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (discharge from an
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must be inadequate, 29 and 3) the injury to the state's quasi-sovereign interest must be
separate and distinct from the injury to
30
the citizens' interest.
The majority and dissenting opinions disagreed on all three
points. The majority did not address the "substantial portion"
requirement, apparently feeling that sufficient numbers were involved.3 1 With respect to remedy, they argued that the private
remedy was inadequate because of the nature of the injury; fear
of retribution prevented suit until the state stepped in, and fear
could prevent enforcement of the injunction as well. 32 A remedy

without enforcement is no remedy at all. The majority also argued that the state had a quasi-sovereign interest in the ability
of its officers to perform their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution and the fourteenth amendment, and that the defendants'
actions had injured the state by impairing the performance of
that duty.33 The majority concluded that the state was entitled
to standing as parens patriae.

The minority responded that five thousand persons out of a
total state population of more than eleven million was insufficient. 34 They also arged that under parens patriae "the soverIllinois-chartered manufacturer polluted the Mississippi River, affecting all
Missouri citizens who lived near the river; parens patriae allowed); New
Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883) (New Hampshire citizens assigned overdue bonds to the state, which then sued for collection; parens
patriae denied). Courts tend to balance number affected and severity of

injury; a severe injury requires fewer plaintiffs than a lesser one. Puerto
Rico v. Alfred L. Snapp &Sons, 632 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1980).
29. This is closely tied to the first requirement and is intended to keep
private suits private. If the individuals can obtain complete relief on their

own, there is no need for the sovereign to intervene. The key is complete

relief. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
30. A separate interest ensures vigorous prosecution of the action and
reinforces the prohibition on vindication of private grievances. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923) (flooding which was allegedly caused
by diversion of natural water flows flooded private lands and destroyed public roads and bridges); Oklahoma v. Atchison, Topeka &Santa Fe R.R., 220
U.S. 277 (1911) (state had no interest in excessive freight rates separate
from its citizens' economic interest; parens patriae denied).
31. The majority also may have been following some Supreme Court
cases which do not concern themselves with numbers, apparently because
the suit is between a state and private citizens of another state. Georgia v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (railroad shippers affected by high
freight rates); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (only
five counties affected by pollution).
32. 659 F.2d 306, 316 (3d Cir. 1981).
33. Id. at 315. The majority expanded the argument by noting that if not
enjoined, continued violations would result in a series of criminal investigations and prosecutions, at great expense to the state. Id.
34. In 1970, Millvale had a population of 5815 (U.S. Census 1970). The
minority decreased the number even more by requiring direct injury. They
then contended that the number of individuals who had been affected was
less than fifty. 659 F.2d 306, 330 (3d Cir. 1981).
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eign was entitled to proceed... only when no individual...
could seek the same relief";35 since the individual plaintiffs
could obtain an injunction just as well as the state, parens patriae could not apply. The minority challenged the quasi-sovereign interest proposed by the majority; while the asserted
interest might indeed establish grounds for applying parenspatriae,36 the interest was neither pleaded nor proved by the state,
and was not properly considered by the court. 37 The minority
concluded that all of the elements of parenspatriae were miss39
ing,38 and that class action was more appropriate.
Courts historically have played a "numbers game" with the
substantial portion requirement of parens patriae. Early opinions said "substantial number," 4 later opinions said "substantial portion." 4 1 The minority and some other courts demand
35. Id. at 328 (emphasis in the original).
36. Id. at 334.

37. Id. at 332-34. The plaintiffs argued the general quasi-sovereign interest of the health, comfort and welfare of its citizens, but it also pleaded a
specific interest in effective law enforcement, which protects the constitutional rights of the citizens. The injury was in the threat to "security, peace,
and good of the state" and the interference with the duty of state officials to
"correct unconstitutional conduct." Brief for Appellee at 27-29, Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1981).
38. The author of the minority opinion, Judge Garth, seems to have
changed his thinking in the four years since Jordan v. School District of the
City of Erie, 548 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1977). In Jordan, a panel which included
Judge Garth allowed the state to intervene as parenspatriae without protest or discussion in a class action suit between students and the school
district over disciplinary regulations. The suit involved only the school children in a city of 125,000. It began as a private action, and the state intervened because the disciplinary rules allegedly violated the fourteenth
amendment, the Pennsylvania constitution, and sections of the Pennsylvania Public Employee Relation Act. Since intervenors have essentially
the same standing as original plaintiffs, In re Raabe, Glissman & Co., 71 F.
Supp. 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), the only material difference between Jordan and
the present action is that, in Jordan, the plaintiffs were class representatives. In this case, Judge Garth demands not only a class action, but removal of the state as a plaintiff, a condition he apparently did not find
necessary in Jordan.
It is possible that the Jordan court thought they were applying the "infants, idiots, and lunatics" version of parens patriae. The state, however,
usually uses that theory when it is protecting the interests of orphans and
wards of the state who have no one else to protect their interests. See supra
note 24. In Jordan, it is reasonable to assume that the vast majority of the
students would be represented adequately by their parents or guardians.
In a memorandum issued January 6, 1976, the Jordan court said that the
Commonwealth had intervened as parens patriae "to protect the constitutional rights of its citizens" and cited Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S.
251 (1972). Brief for Appellee, Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306 (3d Cir.
1981).
39. 659 F.2d 306, 326, 331 (3d Cir. 1981).
40. E.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
41. E.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); Kansas v.
Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902) ("considerable portion").
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"substantial proportion." 42 The differences are subtle, but important. If courts accept "substantial number," they can establish a minimum requirement; if they accept "substantial
proportion," 1,000,000 may be necessary in New York, while 1,000
may be sufficient in Montana. The minority alleged that an insignificant number, fewer than fifty persons, had actually been
injured.43 This argument ignores the purpose of the relief
sought; an injunction is intended to protect persons who may be
injured in the future." The persons who risk injury in the future are all persons who reside in Millvale, or who may visit
there. Because of Millvale's proximity to Pittsburgh, 45 substantially more than the five thousand residents of Millvale may be
at risk, but how many more is not known. Depending upon how
"community" is defined, the number of possible plaintiffs here
may become either the "substantial portion of a community" required by parens patriae, or a group so small as to be a forbidden case of the state litigating private claims as a volunteer."
The minority suggests class action as an alternative. Plaintiffs, however, must satisfy the requirements of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and one of the sections of 23(b),
probably 23(b) (2).47 Defining the class may be difficult. Includ42. Puerto Rico v. Alfred L. Snapp & Sons, 632 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1980)
("substantial proportion"); Pennsylvania ex rel. Shapp v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d
668 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976) ("substantial majority").
The minority goes so far as to require "all members of the community," and
then defines the community as the entire Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
659 F.2d 306, 330-31 (3d Cir. 1981) (Garth, J., dissenting). But see note 38
supra.
43. 659 F.2d 306, 330 (3d Cir. 1981) (Garth, J., dissenting). Other courts

feel that direct injury is not required. Puerto Rico ex rel. Quiros v.
Bramkamp, 654 F.2d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1981).
44. Puerto Rico ex rel. Quiros v. Bramkamp, 654 F.2d 212, 216 (2d Cir.
1981) (Secretary of Labor of Puerto Rico sued New York apple growers for
discrimination against Puerto Rican workers).
45. Population 420,000 (Rand-McNally est. 1979). The metropolitan area
has approximately one million residents.

46. Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 665 (1976) (Pennsylvania
sued New Jersey over New Jersey's tax laws which affected Pennsylvania
residents, but did not affect the rights of the Commonwealth itself).
47. (a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a
class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only
if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a
class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in
addition: ....
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final in-
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ing only the residents of Millvale presents no problem, but unrealistically assumes no "spillover" from Pittsburgh and other
surrounding areas. Such a class would exclude likely victims
such as persons who pass through Millvale each day as they
commute to Pittsburgh, and would, in fact, exclude some of the
present plaintiffs. If the class includes all persons who might
enter Millvale in the future, it may become too large. 48 Also, the
present individual plaintiffs may not qualify as adequate class
representatives; lack of financial resources or change of residence might result in disqualification. 49 Finally, if the state
were removed as a plaintiff, the entire expense of the litigation
would fall on the individual plaintiffs. 50 Since this is a suit for
injunction only, the individuals might not pursue the action because it would involve great expense with no recovery. 51
The minority contended that since a private remedy is available, the state cannot intervene, 52 citing Pennsylvania v. New
junctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the
class as a whole.
FED. R. Crv. P. 23.
48. When the class is excessively large, it may fail for indefiniteness or
for lack of common claims and questions of law. Williams v. Wallace Silversmiths, Inc., 566 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1977) (class as proposed was actually four
classes). In this case, the plaintiffs originally requested a class of all persons residing in or otherwise lawfully in the Borough of Millvale and all
persons who will in the future reside in or lawfully be in the Borough of
Millvale. Brief for Appellee, Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306 (3d Cir.
1981).
49. 659 F.2d 306, 315 (3d Cir. 1981). See National Auto Brokers Corp. v.
General Motors Corp., 60 F.R.D. 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (bankrupt plaintiff not
adequate representative); P.D.Q. Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 61 F.R.D. 372
(S.D. Fla. 1973) (class certified only after court received assurances that
plaintiffs had adequate financial resources); Kay &Sinex, The FinancialAspect of Adequate Representation Under Rule 23(a) (4): A Prerequisiteto
Class Certification?,31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 651 (1977).

50. 659 F.2d 306, 315-16 (3d Cir. 1981). See Comment, Wrongs Without
Remedy: The Concept of ParensPatriaeSuitsfor Treble Damages Under the
Antitrust Laws, 43 S.CAL. L. REV. 570 (1970).

51. Under the "death knell" doctrine, courts presume that without the
possibility of group recovery, individual plaintiffs may find it "economically
imprudent" to pursue an action to final judgment; denial of class certification effectively ends litigation. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livisay, 437 U.S. 463
(1978). Casenote, UnitedAirlines,Inc. v. McDonald: Class Certificationand

the "Uncertain Sound," 11 J. MAR.J. PRAc. &PRoc. 635 (1978).
52. The minority apparently confuses "any" with "adequate" and absolute prohibition of intervention by the sovereign with allowing standing
when the sovereign has a separate quasi-sovereign interest. It relies on a
quote from Pennsylvania v. New Jersey: "It has, however, become settled
doctrine that a State has standing to sue only when its sovereign or quasisovereign interests are implicated and it is not merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens." 426 U.S. 660, 665 (1975). Neither the
language nor the holding support the minority's position of exclusivity of
remedy; the court dismissed the suit for lack of injury to quasi-sovereign
interests without addressing the question of availability of a private remedy. Another favorite quotation in support of exclusivity of remedy is "it
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Jersey.5 3 However, neither the quotation which was used to buttress the argument nor the ruling in that case support that proposition. 54 The Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v. New Jersey
did not prohibit intervention by the sovereign when a private
remedy was available, it merely reiterated that the sovereign
must have a separate and distinct interest of its own. 55 In further support of their position, the minority listed factors which
should be considered in granting parens patriae and included
"the practical ability of those injured to obtain complete relief
without intervention of the sovereign. '56 After including that
factor, they ignored it in their discussion. The evidence before
has long been settled by the decisions of this Court that a State is without
standing to maintain suit for injuries sustained by citizens and inhabitants
for which they may sue in their own behalf." Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
324 U.S. 439, 473 (1945) (Stone, C.J., dissenting). This quotation is from the
dissent, however, and the cases cited to support the statement are the classic cases which illustrate the lack of a separate quasi-sovereign interest,
and do not support a conclusion that the state may sue only if the individuals have no cause of action. Another source of confusion is statements by
courts that the state may sue to redress an injury for which no individual
has standing to sue. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. National Assoc. of Flood Insurers, 520 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1975). This is merely another way of stating that
the state must have a separate interest and does not imply that the state is
barred if individuals have standing. See, e.g., Puerto Rico ex rel. Quiros v.
Bramkamp, 654 F.2d 212 (1981).
53. 426 U.S. 660 (1976) (Pennsylvania sued New Jersey over taxes on
income earned in New Jersey by non-residents).
54. The parenspatriae issue in Pennsylvania v. New Jersey was almost
an afterthought. The main question was whether Pennsylvania had a cause
of action at all. New Jersey taxed any income of non-residents which was
earned in New Jersey. By statute, Pennsylvania allowed its citizens to exclude income earned in New Jersey from Pennsylvania taxes. Pennsylvania then sued New Jersey for draining money from the Pennsylvania
treasury. The Court noted that Pennsylvania did not have to allow the tax
set-off, and that therefore the injury was self-inflicted and did not create a
cause of action. Pennsylvania sued in the alternative as parens patriae.
The Court disallowed standing, citing numerous cases which had denied
parenspatriae for lack of a separate quasi-sovereign interest. 426 U.S. 660,
663 (1976). Including parens patriae in the pleadings seems rather odd
since there is no indication that any individuals had alleged injury under
the New Jersey law.
55. In Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, the Court stated that any injury to
the state was merely the sum of the injuries to its citizens and noted the
decision in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 25 (1972). In Hawaii, the
Court conceded that the state had a quasi-sovereign interest in the economic well-being of the populace, but said that there had been no injury to
that interest which was separate from the injury to its citizens; the injury to
the state was merely the sum of the injuries to the individuals. Under the
facts of that case, injunction was an adequate remedy even without state
intervention. Treble damages were sufficient incentive to both sides to enforce the order. Id. at 262, 265-66.
56. 659 F.2d 306, 333 (3d Cir. 1980) (Garth, J., dissenting), citing Puerto
Rico v. Alfred L. Snapp & Sons, 632 F.2d 365, 369 (4th Cir. 1980) (Puerto Rico
sued Virginia apple growers for discrimination against Puerto Rican
workers).
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the court showed not only repeated violations of rights, but re57
peated intimidation of those who opposed Baranyai's tactics.
As Judge Gibbons noted, fear of retribution is a powerful deterrent to private enforcement. If the suit is retried as a class action, the state will have no clear right to enforcement and must
depend on reluctant victims to bring contempt actions. 58 The incentive to obey the injunction is increased if the state has standing to request enforcement. As a practical matter, federal
injunctions do not usually require enforcement, but the record
of the defendants is such as to raise doubt that they will comply
with the court's order voluntarily.5 9 Without effective enforcement, neither the rights of the individuals nor the rights of the
state are adequately protected.
The greatest obstacle to the use of the doctrine of parens
patriae is the necessity of showing an injury to a separate and
distinct interest. The majority proposed as the separate interest
the sworn duty of state officers to uphold the Constitution, and
an injury to the state when their ability to perform that duty is
impaired. 60 Courts have long held that the presence of a federal
duty implies a corresponding federal right to be free from inter57. Baranyai physically assaulted persons who had filed complaints and
told others to get out of town and stay out. The police chief summoned
complainants to the police station and threatened them with suit if they did
not retract their complaints. He also made personal attacks on the two
council members who voiced opposition to Baranyai, and harassed four
other police officers who testified against or complained about Baranyai.
One of these officers was suspended and then fired because of his testimony. The chief of police also urged other persons to write to the Attorney
General and ask that the Community Advocate Unit be disbanded because
of its investigation and prosecution of Baranyai. Two days after the Deputy
Attorney General filed charges against Baranyai, Baranyai fied a barratry
suit against the Deputy Attorney General. Four months later, the suit was
withdrawn. During the trial in district court, in the hallway outside of the
courtroom and in the presence of plaintiffs' witnesses, Baranyai described
one of the plaintiffs' attorneys as being a Mafia lawyer. He later admitted
that he had made similar statements at other times. The district court
found that this was "typical of defendant's conduct in attempting to harass
witnesses and attorneys who bring proceedings against him." With classic
understatement, the court said that "this is some evidence of consciousness
of guilt." 480 F. Supp. 686, 689-91 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
58. The state is barred from membership in the class. Since it concededly has no rights of its own which are protectable under § 1983, it does not
share the common claims and questions of law as required by Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(a) (2) and 23(a) (3). For the same reason, the state cannot intervene.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2).
59. The defendants took no action to restrain Baranyai even after his
conviction on criminal charges. Counsel in this action agreed before the
trial that Baranyai would be assigned to a desk job until the suit was resolved; Baranyai remained on active duty, patrolling the streets on the orders of the police chief. 659 F.2d 306, 322 (3d Cir. 1981).
60. Id. at 314-16.
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ference in the performance of that duty.6 But is the proposed
interest separate and distinct? Courts have recognized a separate interest when the injury to any individual was small or difficult to prove, but the injury to the state as a whole was
substantial.62 In such cases, the injury claimed by the state
could not be remedied by individual action. The opposite is true
here; if the individual plaintiffs obtain an injunction, the state's
injury is also remedied. The individual interest is preserving
personal rights; the interest of the state is performing its duty
under the fourteenth amendment, which requires an interest in
preserving personal freedoms. The interests may arise from different sources, but they merge in the result. They are distinct,
but not separate.
An alternative approach is to give the state standing because there is no separate interest. 63 In a unique decision, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit used this theory in an
analogous situation in Brewer v. Hoxie School District No. 46.64
Shortly after the Supreme Court decided the second Brown v.
61. United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944) (voter in congressional
election has right to have vote counted honestly); Logan v. United States,
144 U.S. 263 (1892) (prisoners have federal right to protection while in federal custody); United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76 (1884) (homesteader
under federal homestead act has right to protection from conspiracy to
drive him off his land).
62. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931) (defendant polluted
common inland waterways with sewage); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,
262 U.S. 553 (1923) (West Virginia natural gas regulations discriminated
against out-of-state users); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230
(1907) (Tennessee smelter destroyed plant life in five Georgia counties);
Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (Illinois resident corporation polluted Mississippi River).
63. Both the district and circuit courts touched on this approach.
"While the court did not certify a class action, it was held that the case was
one in effect in view of the fact that the Commonwealth was representing
the rights of all its citizens and we are treating this case in such light." 480
F. Supp. 686, 695 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
[ E ]yen if its parenspatriae standing as a plaintiff were not recognized,
it should in any event be recognized as an adequate class representative of the class of persons ... who in the past have been and in the
future may be subjected to violations of constitutional rights ....
The
trial court's failure to certify the action as a class action is not fatal to
recognition of the Commonwealth's representative standing in such a
case, since the same record has been made as would have been made
had a Rule 23(b) (2) class been certified. See Pasadena City Board of

Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1976).
659 F.2d 306, 319 (3d Cir. 1981).

The Pasadena case is inapposite here since the right of the United

States to maintain the suit as an intervenor even after the suits of the individual plaintiffs became moot was expressly allowed by statute.

64. 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956).
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Board of Education65 in 1955, the members of the Hoxie, Arkansas, school board determined that the Brown decision required
them to desegregate their district as soon as possible, in spite of
state laws which required segregated schools. 66 A few weeks after the desegregated Hoxie schools opened, the defendants began efforts to disrupt the operation of the schools and to force a
return to segregated facilities. The members of the school
67
board, as a board and as individuals, ified suit in federal court.
The district court issued an injunction prohibiting further disruption, and the court of appeals affirmed.
The court of appeals held that the plaintiffs, bound by their
duty to uj)hold the Constitution, had an implied corresponding
right to be free from interference with performance of that
duty.68 While the general rule is that a plaintiff does not have
standing to vindicate the constitutional rights of another, the
court noted that this is "only a rule of practice. '6 9 Exceptions
are made when the plaintiffs' interests are closely aligned with
the interests of the parties who were actually injured. 70 The
court held that the interests of the school board were sufficiently
close to the real parties in interest, i.e., the children, to create an
exception.
[T]he realities of this case are that the school board is in loco
parentis of the children whose rights are at stake ...

.

. The school

board having the duty to afford the children the equal protection of
the law has the correlative right, as has been pointed out, to protection in performance of its function. Its right is intimately identified
with the right of the children themselves. The right does not arise
concerned, but from the nesolely from the interest of the parties
71
cessity of the government itself.
65. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (the
first opinion was the desegration decision; the second was the enforcement
order).
66. Arkansas law required maintenance of separate facilities for black
and white students. At the time of desegregation, the Hoxie school district
had about 1000 students, twenty-four of whom were black. 238 F.2d 91, 93
(8th Cir. 1956).
67. The defendants challenged the jurisdiction of the court saying that
the action was a purely state issue of trespass and belonged in the state

courts. In a lengthy discussion, the court noted that "whether or not the
controversy arises under federal law must be determined by the allegations
of the complaint and they were obviously drawn to make the alleged violations of the federal law the basis of the suit." 238 F.2d 91, 95 (8th Cir. 1956).
68. Id. at 99.
69. Id. at 104, citing Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953).
70. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (NAACP permitted to
litigate the rights of its members); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (statute required all children to attend public schools; parochial
school allowed standing to sue).
71. 238 F.2d 91, 104 (8th Cir. 1956).
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A state also has the duty to afford all its citizens the equal
protection of the law, and, therefore, the correlative right to freedom from interference in performance of its duty. If the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit is followed in this case, the interests of
a state are so interwoven with the rights of its citizens as to give
it standing in a court of law or equity. Applying the Brewer approach to this case avoids the inherent problems of both parens
patriae and class actions. Numbers become less critical, certification requirements and diversity or identity of interest become
irrelevant, and both the state and individuals can request
enforcement.
Using Brewer also avoids expanding the boundaries of
parens patriae which courts have guarded so jealously for so
long. Parenspatriae has been restricted in the past to disputes
between states or between a state and citizens of another state.
Brewer operates rather like parenspatriae,but on an intrastate
level, i.e., a governmental body against its own citizens. The
barriers to the use of parens patriae were developed for sound
reasons 72 which have not eroded with time. It is still important
that private suits not abuse direct access to the Supreme Court
by masquerading as disputes between states and that any
proper suit be prosecuted vigorously. It is also important that a
state be able to protect the interests of its citizens in intrastate
disputes. Since suits brought under § 1983 rarely involve the
large numbers required for standing under parenspatriaeor an
interstate dispute, and the requisite injury to the state is not
easily proved, the choice becomes one of abandoning the traditional bounds, applying a different legal theory, or allowing a
wrong without a remedy. If the choice is to expand the boundaries, the courts must then establish new ones which will not
open the floodgates of litigation. On the other hand, limiting actions under § 1983 to individual or class suits permits the possibility or even probability that many victims will choose not to
pursue their legal remedies for fear of retribution or for lack of
money. Brewer allows governmental units to adequately protect
the interests of its citizens without diluting the usefulness of
parens patriae.
The alternative approach of Brewer presents a workable
compromise on the issues which divided the court. The judges
in this case disagreed on legal theories, but agreed on the result.
The Brewer approach produces the same result as parens patriae, but does not involve what might be seen as excessive tinkering with and expansion of an established doctrine. Parens
patriae is, by its nature, a resort to extraordinary means of ob72. See supra notes 28-30.
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taining justice when private remedies are inadequate. Brewer
allows the state to litigate the violation of the rights of its citizens without diluting the extraordinary quality of parens patriae. It also avoids the delays and uncertainties of remanding
for class certification and retrial. Brewer has been cited many
times for the proposition that a federal duty implies a federal
right; perhaps it is time that it was also cited for its unique approach to protection of fourteenth amendment rights.
Cheryl Johnson

